Shulchan Aruch: Chapter 261 - Time to Kindle Shabbos Lights

“Twilight” or “dusk.”

Shabbos 34a. See subsections 4 and 5 and notes for more details concerning the definition of this time period.

A mil is a Talmudicmeasure of distance equivalent to approximately 960 meters (.596 of a mile) according to Shiurei Torah. According to the Alter Rebbe (see Seder Hachnasas Shabbos in the Alter Rebbe’s Siddur), it takes 24 minutes for an average person to walk a mil. Thus we are speaking of a measure of 18 minutes.This follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah (Shabbos, loc. cit.).

In the above source, however, the Alter Rebbe explains that the duration of bein hashmashos should be calculated according to the concept of שעות זמניות, “seasonal hours,” and thus this period would be 18 minutes only when the days and nights are of equal duration. Thus in the summer, bein hashmashos would be longer than 18 minutes and in the winter, shorter. This follows the Alter Rebbe’s opinion in his Siddur, Hilchos Kerias Shema. Also, as the Alter Rebbe states in that source, this measure of time only applies in Eretz Yisrael, Babylonia, and lands of similar latitude. In places of more northerly (or southerly) latitudes, the measure is longer or shorter, depending on the season.

This is an additional stringency instituted in respect of the opinion of Rabbi Yosei (Shabbos, loc. cit.). In the Alter Rebbe’s Siddur, he rules that this is a longer time period, “about two minutes.” See Seder Hachnasas Shabbos (Levin), footnotes 22-24. The total length of bein hashmashos (in Eretz Yisrael, when the days and nights are of equal duration) is then 20 minutes.

In his Seder Hachnasas Shabbos, the Alter Rebbe speaks about the need to admonish those who perform forbidden activities during this time.

The sacrifice to be brought when one is unsure whether he unwittingly violated a Scriptural prohibition punishable by kareis. When there is a doubt whether a Scriptural prohibition applies, one must conduct himself stringently. There are, however, varying opinions whether the obligation for stringency is Scriptural or Rabbinic in origin. By stating that one is liable to bring this sacrifice, the Alter Rebbe indicates that the prohibition against performing a forbidden labor during the period of bein hashmashos is Scriptural in origin (see Rambam, Hilchos Tuma’as Meis 9:12; Kesef Mishneh to that source; Responsa Tzemach Tzedek, Yoreh Deah 71; Seder Hachnasas Shabbos (Levin), footnote 14; Klalei HaPoskim V’Hahora’ah (Farkash) 78).

Generally, in an instance of a compounded doubt (safek s’feikah), there is room for leniency even when a Scriptural prohibition is involved. The Alter Rebbe explains that this concept does not apply here, because the second cause for doubt – whether or not bein hashamashos has already begun – is of no consequence. Since the doubt is a result of a lack of knowledge, it is not considered significant.

In his Seder Hachnasas Shabbos, the Alter Rebbe speaks of “a passing mitzvah,” i.e., one that if not fulfilled now, could not be fulfilled later, e.g., making an eruv chatzeiros or the like, as mentioned in the following subsection.

Even activities that concern one’s personal affairs (and not a mitzvah) are permitted if the matter is very pressing or involves a significant loss (sec. 342:1).

Activities that are forbidden by Rabbinic law because they resemble the forbidden labors, or lest they lead one to commit a forbidden labor (Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 21:1).

Similarly, one may establish an eruv tavshilin (that allows one to cook on a festival for Shabbos) at that time (sec. 527:9).

Shabbos 34a.

In that source, the Alter Rebbe states that it is a mitzvah to establish an eruv chatzeiros so that people will not violate a Rabbinic prohibition by carrying in the courtyard.

The obligation to immerse utensils purchased from non-Jews is discussed by the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro (Yoreh Deah, sec. 120), and by the Alter Rebbe in 323:8.

In sec. 323:8, the Alter Rebbe rules that the requirement to immerse utensils is Scriptural. Nevertheless, the prohibition against immersing them on Shabbos is Rabbinic and is waived bein hashmashos when the person has no other utensils to use on Shabbos.

I.e., in Eretz Yisrael where the obligation to tithe is practiced, even in the present era. It is forbidden to tithe produce on Shabbos itself, as stated in sec. 339:7.

As mentioned in the Kuntreis Acharon (note 1, see footnote 22), tithing food to eat on Shabbos is not considered an action performed for the sake of a mitzvah if one has other food. Therefore, it is forbidden bein hashmashos.

I.e., in contrast to Eretz Yisrael where the obligation to separate challah is essentially Scriptural in nature.

Hence, there is no necessity to separate challah bein hashmashos. See sec. 260:5.

Produce concerning which there is a question whether it was tithed or not. As a stringency, our Sages required tithes to be separated from it. From the Alter Rebbe’s Kuntreis Acharon (note 1), it appears that even when the person has other produce that he may use for Shabbos, he is allowed to tithe produce that is demai.

Shabbos, loc. cit.

In that source, the Alter Rebbe explains that it is forbidden to insulate foods on Shabbos because one might find a pot of food that cooled off and insulate it in a substance that will increase its heat, causing him to be liable for cooking. However, this is unlikely to occur during bein hashmashos since most cooked food is still hot at that time.

In subsection 1, the Alter Rebbe mentions two situations where one may perform an activity forbidden by Rabbinic Law bein hashmashos – when a mitzvah is involved or a matter is very pressing. In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 1), the Alter Rebbe explains that it is permitted to insulate hot food bein hashmashos even if neither of these reasons apply, for example, one has other warm foods insulated for Shabbos and thus he has no great need to insulate additional food. Although he is doing so to partake of the food on Shabbos, this is not considered as an act performed for the sake of a mitzvah. (As support for this statement, the Alter Rebbe cites Turei Zahav 342:1 who rules that if one has other food, tithing produce to serve on Shabbos is not considered as an action performed for the sake of a mitzvah and is therefore forbidden bein hashmashos.) Thus there is a difference between the greater leniency granted for insulating food and the leniencies mentioned previously in this subsection.

The Alter Rebbe proceeds to explain that when one has no other warm food insulated for Shabbos, insulating food is considered as necessary for the enjoyment of the mitzvah of Shabbos. Hence, Rabbinic prohibitions may be superseded for this reason, as reflected by the ruling in sec. 259:6 permitting the use of stones for insulation even though they are muktzeh.

In conclusion, the Alter Rebbe explains that a distinction can be made between cooked food and produce. Produce is never a fundamental element of the meal; one can always do without it. When, however, there is an important dish – even when one has other food – one may perform activities forbidden as shvusim, because it can be considered as necessary for the Shabbos meal and as such, are considered as a Shabbos necessity.

I.e., in a situation where there is no light in a room, forcing the inhabitants to sit in the dark and thereby detracting from the peace and tranquility of Shabbos.

A halachic construct enabling a person to extend the 2000 cubit distance – approximately a kilometer – that he is permitted to walk beyond a city’s Shabbos limits. Employing an eruv techumin enables a person to walk an additional 2000 cubits (Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilchos Shabbos 27:1; Hilchos Eruvin 6:1-2; the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, sec. 408:1).

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 2), the Alter Rebbe explains that establishing an eruv techumin is more severe than establishing an eruv chatzeiros (see the beginning of the subsection), for the reason he proceeds to state here: that establishing an eruv techumin is equivalent to formalizing an acquisition.

Shabbos, loc. cit.

This section is not extant in the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch. See Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro, Orach Chayim 415:2. It appears that the Alter Rebbe is referring to the rationale given by Rashi (see following note). The rationale for why the Alter Rebbe requires an additional reason is explained in that note.

According to Jewish Law, a transfer of both land and movable property is not brought about by a verbal agreement and, in many instances, nor not even by the payment of money. Instead, a kinyan, a binding act of contract, must be carried out to formalize the acquisition.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 2), the Alter Rebbe explains that this rationale was cited by Magen Avraham 261:4. The Alter Rebbe questions why Magen Avraham did not cite the rationale stated by Rashi (Shabbos 34a) – that establishing an eruv techumin is considered as more severe because it involves a significant improvement to which there is a Scriptural allusion, i.e. the verse prohibiting walking beyond the Shabbos limits, Shmos 16:29. The Alter Rebbe explains that, in this ruling, Rashi follows his approach that when our Sages forbade an activity as a shvus, they upheld that decree even when the activity was required for the sake of a mitzvah. This position is not followed by Rambam (Hilchos Shabbos 24:1) and the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro, (Orach Chayim 261:1) as reflected in the ruling allowing a person to tithe produce (even though doing so also brings about a significant improvement according to Scriptural Law) if it is necessary for the Shabbos meals. Hence, the reason why establishing an eruv techumin bein hashmashos is forbidden is – as stated by Magen Avraham and quoted in the main text – because doing so resembles making an acquisition.

There, Scripture relates that transactions involving various products were being carried out openly in the market places of Jerusalem on Shabbos, and Nechemiah severely rebuked the people for such conduct, as it is written: “I warned them on the day they sold provisions… and I said to them, ‘What is this evil thing that you are doing, profaning the Shabbos day?’ ”

I.e., not for the sake of a mitzvah.

Since the prohibition against going beyond one’s 2000 cubit Shabbos limits is a Rabbinic ordinance and there is doubt whether bein hashmashos is Shabbos or not, we follow the principle: When there is a doubt regarding a Rabbinic ordinance, we rule leniently (Mishnah Berurah 415:9). Hence, although initially, stringency is required for the reasons explained above, after the fact, leniency is granted.

This was – and still is – a very common practice during the summer in the northerly or southerly regions when sunset does not occur until very late in the evening.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 3), the Alter Rebbe makes a distinction between the acceptance of Shabbos mentioned here and the acceptance of tosefes Shabbos, an addition to Shabbos mentioned in sec. 393. With this distinction, he resolves an apparent contradiction between the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro in this section and Rav Yosef Caro’s ruling in sec. 393:2.

To explain: In sec. 393:2, Rav Yosef Caro cites a difference of opinion among the Rishonim whether one may establish an eruv chatzeiros if he accepted the Shabbos while it was still day. From the wording Rav Yosef Caro uses in that source, it appears that he accepts the more lenient view that an eruv chatzeiros may be established, while here, he follows the more stringent perspective.

In resolution to the above contradiction in Rav Yosef Caro’s rulings, the Alter Rebbe distinguishes between kabbalas Shabbos, the acceptance of Shabbos itself, and kabbalas tosefes Shabbos, adding to the Shabbos by adding time both from Friday afternoon and Saturday night to Shabbos (see subsections 4-5, sec. 267:2, and sec. 293:1). The laws pertaining to one’s conduct during tosefes Shabbos – the Alter Rebbe explains – resemble those pertaining to one’s conduct bein hashmashos, provided that one has not yet accepted the Shabbos. In both instances, although one is bound by the Shabbos prohibitions, prohibitions that are merely of Rabbinic origin may be superseded by an urgent need. In sec. 393, Rav Yosef Caro is speaking about such a situation. When, by contrast, one formally accepted Shabbos or Shabbos is thrust upon him in one of the manners stated in the main text, even when it is still day, he is fully bound by all the Shabbos laws without exception.

With regard to the question dealt with by Rav Yosef Caro in sec. 393:2: The Alter Rebbe states that one may not rely on the more lenient view even though there is a pressing need. True, as a general rule, one may rely on a lenient opinion – even though it is a minority view – in cases of pressing need. Nevertheless, this principle does not apply in the instance under consideration, because the difference of opinion among the Rishonim concerns the very issue of what to do in a pressing situation. Thus it does not resemble differences of opinion regarding ordinary circumstances.

See also the Kuntreis Acharon (note 6) to that section.

Even though his actions would in of themselves be permitted, since he – or the community – accepted the Shabbos, he is bound by this restriction.

I.e., the Jews themselves perform the labors forbidden on Shabbos.

Indeed, as Alter Rebbe states in sec. 263:25, although one accepts the Shabbos before nightfall, he may even ask a fellow Jew who has not yet accepted the Shabbos to perform such a task for him.

This follows the opinion of Rabbeinu Tam (see the notes to subsection 5), which maintains that there is time to walk 4 mil (72 or 96 minutes) between the setting of the sun and nightfall. Thus half an hour before nightfall is well after sunset and everyone in this locale may well have already accepted Shabbos.

For, as stated in sec. 256:1, at this time, announcements are made, urging people to make their final preparations for Shabbos.

In sec. 333:6, the Alter Rebbe gives an example of a need that arises for the sake of a mitzvah: hosting guests from out of town. Hosting one’s local friends, by contrast, is not included in this category.

See subsection 2.

According to the Alter Rebbe’s ruling is his Siddur, this addition should be made during the period between the “visible sunset” (shekiah hanir’is), and the “actual sunset” (shekiah ha’amitis), which is approximately four minutes (in Eretz Yisrael at the time of year when the days and nights are of equal duration). See Seder Hachnasas Shabbos (Levin), footnote 7.

From the above wording, it appears that this additional time affects only the prohibition against forbidden labor and not the positive expressions of the holiness of Shabbos. See the discussion of this subject in Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 19, p. 58-59, and Vol. 16, p. 235, footnote 31.

Vayikra 23:32. The interpretation of the verse which follows is a quote from Yoma 81b; Rosh HaShanah 9a. It is unusual for the Alter Rebbe to quote an entire passage from the Talmudin its original form.

Implying that the fast must start in the evening, after the ninth has passed.

In the original, mibe’od yom.

See Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 16, p. 231ff., where the Rebbe offers three interpretations of the concept of tosefes Shabbos:

a) Tosefes Shabbos is an obligation that a person must accept upon himself; as long as he does not accept Shabbos, he is permitted to perform labors that are forbidden on Shabbos;

b) the Torah’s commandment to add from the mundane to the holy sanctifies the time; even if one does not accept the Shabbos during the time period of tosefes Shabbos, he is liable if he violates the Shabbos prohibitions at that time;

c) Shabbos itself sanctifies the time before and after Shabbos; its holiness is not self-contained, but extends to its immediate neighboring times as well.

The verse equates the two evenings: Just as time must be added to the evening preceding the fast, so too must time be added in the evening following the fast.

The plural term tishbasu has Shabbos (שבת) as its root. It refers to the other festivals, which are also known by the term Shabbasos, “days of rest.”

See sec. 267:2, and sec. 293:1.

This addition can be made a) through prayer, as stated in subsection 7, b) by kindling the Shabbos lights, as stated in sec. 263:6, c) by formalizing one’s acceptance in thought or in speech (see Kuntreis Acharon, note 3), d) simply waiting until bein hashmashos when, because of the immanence of Shabbos, it is as if he is forced to accept it (ibid.).

By adding the words “to make,” we have emphasized that this addition must be accepted by a person, in contrast to Shabbos itself which is sanctified from Above. If one waits until bein hashmashos, the addition to Shabbos is “forced upon him,” as it were, independent of his decision. See Kuntreis Acharon, note 3.

Based on footnote 3, this is a measure of 60 minutes.

In this subsection (as also in sec. 331:5 and sec. 608:1), the Alter Rebbe follows the opinion of the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro (in the corresponding sections in his text), which accepts the view of Rabbeinu Tam (see note 36). When his opinion is coupled with the opinion that it takes 18 minutes to walk a mil, nightfall is considered 72 minutes (the time it takes to walk four mil) after sunset. The first 58 ½ minutes are not even considered bein hashmashos, but as daytime. The next 13 ½ minutes — the time it takes to walk three-quarters of a mil — are considered bein hashmashos. The addition to Shabbos, Yom Kippur, and the festivals must be made in the period that precedes the beginning of bein hashmashos. However, this can be after sunset, for according to Rabbeinu Tam, the status of the day has not yet changed.

In Seder Hachnasas Shabbos that appears in his Siddur, the Alter Rebbe notes that, in contrast to his ruling in Orach Chayim, elsewhere in his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 262:5), R. Yosef Caro does not accept Rabbeinu Tam’s position at all. This is also evident from the statements of Sifsei Cohen 262:9. Similarly, many other Rishonim do not accept the view of Rabbeinu Tam. Moreover, the Alter Rebbe points out, by 72 minutes after sunset many more than three medium-sized stars are visible to the naked eye.

Accordingly, he rules there according to those who differ with Rabbeinu Tam (referred to as “the opinion of the Geonim”), that bein hashmashos begins at sunset, i.e. the time when the sun is no longer seen. He further explains that in Eretz Yisrael there is a difference of approximately four minutes between shkiah haniris, the “visible sunset,” and true sunset, the disappearance of the sun from the horizon as would be observed from the peaks of the tall mountains there. The obligation to add time from the realm of the mundane to the realm of holiness relates to this four-minute margin. This is followed by the period of bein hashmashos, which lasts 18 minutes. (This calculation follows the view that it takes 24 minutes to walk a mil, and the time it takes to walk three-quarters of a mil is 18 minutes.)

As mentioned previously, the above applies only in the months of Nissan and Tishrei. Throughout the year, the time varies slightly according to the angle of the sun’s position in relation to earth. In countries located to the north or to the south of Eretz Yisrael, the time is slightly different.

See note 3 for a definition of that term.

Since, according to Rabbeinu Tam, nightfall is considered 72 seasonal minutes after sunset, this time is only three minutes before sunset. According to the Alter Rebbe’s position in his Siddur where he considers a day as ending at sunset, p’lag haminchah is 75 seasonal minutes before sunset.

This opinion differs both from that of Rabbeinu Tam and the approach advocated by the Alter Rebbe in his Siddur. It is not mentioned in the Siddur at all, and is therefore not taken into account in actual practice.

According to Rabbeinu Tam’s approach, kindling Shabbos lights at that time is too early for them to be considered as kindled for the sake of the Shabbos day. The same law also applies according to the Alter Rebbe’s conclusion in the Siddur, if the person kindled the lights more than a seasonal hour and quarter before sunset.

See also sec. 331:5, where the Alter Rebbe reiterates this position. Nevertheless, as mentioned, in his Seder Hachnasas Shabbos that appears in his Siddur, the Alter Rebbe retracted these statements, ruling that bein hashmashos begins right after sunset and p’lag haminchah is considered an hour and a quarter before sunset.

Shabbos 35b. The Alter Rebbe’s reference to such signs points to the inaccuracy of the time-keeping devices available in those eras. Needless to say, at present, when accurate calendars and clocks are readily available, one should use them to calculate the time to kindle the Shabbos lights and cease performing forbidden labor (Mishnah Berurah 261:27). See, however, Seder Hachnasas Shabbos (Levin), footnote 45, regarding some of the limitations found even in today’s printed calendars. In addition, it should be mentioned that care must be exercised when using websites, computer programs, phone apps, etc., since there are wide variations and inaccuracies among them.

The Alter Rebbe is referring to the addition of this psalm in the Kabbalas Shabbos service. That entire service was not formalized in the Talmudicera and was added later.

At present, when, by and large, Lubavitch practice is to recite the Kabbalas Shabbos service after nightfall, tosefes Shabbos is accepted at the “visible sunset” (shekiah hanir’is).