Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day
Sanhedrin veha’Onashin haMesurin lahem - Chapter 11
Sanhedrin veha’Onashin haMesurin lahem - Chapter 11
See Chapter 2, Halachah 10.
See Chapter 5, Halachah 3.
For since there are two litigants involved, what is to the detriment of one is to the advantage of the other.
Chapter 10, Halachah 7.
See Chapter 8, Halachah 1.
If a court realizes that it made an error, the judgment is rescinded and a new judgment is rendered. See Chapter 6.
Chapter 10, Halachah 9.
Who sit and observe the court.
See Chapter 10, Halachah 8.
Chapter 10, Halachah 2.
See Chapter 3, Halachah 4.
Sanhedrin 34b derives this concept based on Numbers 25:4: “Hang them before God before the sun.”
If the court sees that the judges desire to convict the defendant, a final judgment is not rendered. Instead, the judges debate the matter throughout the entire night in the hope of finding a basis for acquittal. On the following day, they gather together and they are polled again (Sanhedrin 32a, 35a, see Chapter 12, Halachah 3).
I.e., because two successive sittings of the court might be necessary.
For doing so involves the transgression of one of the Torah’s commandments. As stated in Hilchot Shabbat 24:7, one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah is not to execute a guilty person on the Sabbath.
For once a person is convicted, he should be executed immediately. It is considered as agonizing to allow him to live with the sword of death hanging over him.
From this ruling, we can see that ordinarily a person was not imprisoned before his trial began. Instead, he would be arrested and tried on that very same day.
To enable the litigants and the judges to carry out their preparations for the Sabbath [P’nei Moshe (Jerusalem Talmud, Sanhedrin 4:6)]. Alternatively, a judgment must be made patiently, with peace of mind, and that would be difficult on Friday because of the necessary Sabbath preparations (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 5:3). See also Chapter 25, Halachah 9.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 5:2) writes that it is also forbidden to hold court on the day preceding a festival. The Ramah quotes opinions which maintain that in the present age, judgments may be rendered on Fridays and on the days preceding festivals.
As mentioned in Hilchot Shabbat 23:14, although one would be allowed to hold court and render a judgment on the Sabbath or a festival itself according to Scriptural Law, our Sages forbade doing so as a safeguard, lest one write.
I.e., all the distinctions mentioned in Halachah 1 between cases involving financial matters and cases involving capital punishment.
The punishment granted for the violation of one of the Torah’s prohibition that involves a deed, and is not punishable by execution. See Chapters 18 and 19. See also Chapter 16, Halachah 1, which draws an equation between lashes and execution.
The punishment given for accidental murder. See Hilchot Rotzeach, chs. 5 and 6.
And not 23 as is the case with regard to laws involving capital punishment.
On the basis of Exodus 21:19, Sanhedrin 2a states that an ox is condemned to death in the same manner as its master, i.e., by a court of 23 judges. See Chapter 5, Halachah 2.
See Deuteronomy 13:2-12 and Hilchot Avodat Kochavim, Chapter 5, where the laws governing such a transgressor are explained.
I.e., the person who he has been enticed should inform the court. Together they contrive a plan so that the mesit will make his statements in the presence of witnesses who can see and hear him even though he cannot see them. See Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 5:3.
The person whom he seeks to proselytize should, however, tell him: “How can we forsake our God in heaven and serve stone and wood?” (ibid.). As Tosafot, Sanhedrin 8b, explains, this statement impresses the mesit with the severity of his actions. If the mesit does not repeat his statements after receiving this warning, he is not executed.
See Chapter 12, Halachah 2, which states that, to be executed for other transgressions, a person must receive a warning from two witnesses and acknowledge that warning.
This is the direct opposite of the laws that apply with regard to others tried for sins punishable by execution, as stated in Chapter 10, Halachah 9. The rationale for these stringencies is that Deuteronomy 13:9 states: “Do not have pity and do not cover up for him.”
Instead, he must offer his own defense. In contrast, in other instances, the court and even the students observing the court (see Chapter 10, Halachah 8) are encouraged to offer defenses.
Although because of their tendency to cruelty, they are not fit to judge other cases involving capital punishment, as stated in Chapter 2, Halachah 3.
Compare also to the Guide to the Perplexed, Vol. II, Ch. 39, which states: “Mercy to the cruel is cruelty to the merciful.”
Although this verse is stated with regard to an ir hanidachat, a city that was led astray, i.e., after idol worship, its motivating rationale also applies with regard to a mesit.
This is an act of deference and respect for that judge. Nevertheless, if that judge desires, as an expression of humility, he may forgo this token of respect. Sanhedrin 36a relates that this was the practice of Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi who began by asking the judges of the lowest stature (Radbaz).
As stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 3, the judges are seated in a semi-circle and the judges of the highest stature are seated in the center. Beginning from the side means asking the judge of the lowest stature to state his opinion first.
As stated in Chapter 10, Halachah 6, we fear that otherwise, the judges of lesser stature will be intimidated and will fear to contradict the opinions of the judge of greater stature.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 18:5) interprets this as referring to an instance where the student relies on the teacher and has not developed sufficient independent thinking processes to consider the laws abstractly and apply them to different situations on his own. See also Halachah 10.
The Rambam’s ruling is based on Sanhedrin 36a. His version of that text was apparently different from the standard printed text. The standard printed version includes cases involving financial laws in the same category as cases involving capital punishment. For this reason, the Ra’avad objects to the Rambam’s ruling.
Rashi explains that with regard to rulings concerning ritual purity, it is not necessary that a question be judged by any minimum amount of judges. Hence, every person’s opinion is counted equally. With regard to cases involving capital punishment and the other types of judgment mentioned, the Torah requires a specific number of judges at the outset. This implies that every judge is important and hence, a father and a son may not be counted together.
According to Rabbinic Law, there is no minimum amount of judges necessary to adjudicate questions of financial law. Hence the version of Sanhedrin possessed by the Rambam places these laws together with the laws of ritual purity.
I.e., he is given the status of a member of the court. He participates in the debate and he is counted in the reckoning of the opinions of the judges (Kessef Mishneh).
According to the Rambam, this refers to the pronouncement of the verdict: “So-and-so, you are liable,” or “So-and-so, you are vindicated” (Kessef Mishneh). The Ra’avad differs and maintains that this refers to the polling of the judges. Hence he objects to the Rambam’s statements.
See Hilchot Edut 16:5.
And thus capable of developing insightful rationales.
I.e., the laws received from the previous generation regarding a particular issue.
Sanhedrin 36b cites as an example Rav Kahaneh and Rav Assi who were students of Rav. They were highly intelligent and capable of reasoning with the greatest sages of the age. They lacked, however, the knowledge of certain laws. Rav would convey these laws to them and they would participate as full members of the court.
I.e., the students are then considered as judges in their own right, independent of their teacher.
Rashi explains the rationale for this ruling. Ultimately, the entire Jewish people received the body of Torah knowledge from Moses. What difference does it make on which level of the chain a person is? What is significant is that they can assimilate the knowledge and apply it to the particulars of a given situation.
See Chapter 2, Halachah 9, where this concept is explained at length.
If, however, he is blind in both eyes, he is not acceptable to serve as a judge at all (ibid.).
Implied is that for four generations, we know that the person’s lineage is acceptable.
Chapter 2, Halachah 9.
To purchase this book or the entire series, please click here.

