Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

For this reason, we do not say that the witnesses must pay the entire amount of the ketubah. Instead, we calculate the amount as the Rambam elaborates.

Rav Moshe HaCohen, the Lechem Mishneh, and the Mishneh LiMelech emphasize that the Rambam’s intent is that the witnesses are required to pay the difference between the face value of the ketubah and the value the woman could receive for its sale immediately. It is not appropriate to require them to pay only the amount the woman would receive, for they are trying to cause the husband a loss, not the woman. There are authoritative manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah which also point to this interpretation. See also Rashi’s commentary to Makkot 3a.

And hence, likely to live for a long time and thus outlive her husband and collect the money due her by virtue of her ketubah.

People will not be willing to pay the same ratio of one tenth. Since a large sum is not involved, they are not anxious to risk their money. The Radbaz differs with the Rambam and maintains that people will be more willing to risk a smaller amount (10 zuz) to gain a relatively larger amount (100) than to risk a larger amount (100) for an immense sum (1000). A small amount (10), people will not consider significant; it’s like buying a lottery ticket. When, however, a large outlay (100) must be made at the outset, they will hesitate.

And are thus variable in every time and place according to the conditions that prevail in that society.

For this is the amount that the lying witnesses endeavored to cause him to lose.

As explained in Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 1:2, when an ox which is not known to gore gores another ox, the owner is required to pay only half the damages it caused. Since the witnesses are required to pay the amount they conspired to cause the owner to lose, they must pay this sum.

The owner of an ox that gores is not obligated to pay from his own personal financial resources (ibid 1:3). And since the owner is not required to pay more than the value of the ox, the witnesses are likewise not required.

Since it is ordinary for oxen to cause damage in this manner, the owner would have to pay the full amount of the damages (ibid. 4-5). Hence the witnesses are required to pay that sum.

In both of these instances, the master is required to free a Canaanite servant if he inflicts these injuries upon him. Since he is required to free him for the first injury, the master would be obligated to pay him financial reimbursement for the second injury.

Because through their testimony, the servant would be freed.

Because of the financial reimbursement he would have been required to make.
The Ra’avad and others have questioned the Rambam’s ruling here, noting that in Hilchot Chovel UMazik 4:11, the Rambam himself rules that if a person knocks out the tooth of his servant and then blinds [the servant’s] eye, the master is not required to pay the servant for his eye. The rationale is that since the servant did not receive his bill of release, he is not considered as possessing an independent financial capacity. If, however, the servant seizes payment for his eye from the master, he is allowed to retain possession of what he seized. Accordingly, the Ra’avad questions why the witnesses should be held liable. If the owner would not be required to pay for the eye, why should they?
The Lechem Mishneh explains that the Rambam’s intent is that if the owner seizes payment for the eye from the witnesses, he is allowed to retain possession. The Emek HaMelech states that the Rambam is indeed speaking about a situation where the master gave the servant a deed of release before damaging his eye. The Radbaz, however, gives a straightforward answer. It is very likely that the servant will seize the master’s property. Hence it is considered as if the testimony of the witnesses would have caused him this loss as well.

Bava Kama 73b states that this refers to the following situation: Witnesses testified that the master knocked out the servant's tooth and blinded his eye. Afterwards, a second pair of witnesses testified that the master blinded the servant's eye and afterwards knocked out his tooth. In doing so, they wished to reduce the payment due the servant, for the damages due for the loss of a tooth are substantially lower than those due for the loss of an eye. Therefore if it is discovered that they lied, they are required to make restitution to the servant.

Minus the worth of the tooth.

For a woman to be tried as a sotah, her husband must issue a warning in the presence of witnesses and then witnesses must observe her entering into privacy with the other man.

Only one witness is involved. Nevertheless, in this instance, the testimony of one lying witness has an effect, for- as stated in Hilchot Sotah 1:14 - we believe the word of one witness in such circumstances. Hence the laws of a lying witness apply to him.

Since they say that she committed adultery, it is obvious that they wish to deprive her of the money due her by virtue of her ketubah. For if their intent was merely to cause her to be forbidden to her husband, that is achieved by testifying that she disobeyed the warning (Merkevat HaMishneh).

For a defendant is never required both to make financial restitution and to be lashed, as stated in Chapter 18, Halachah 1.

A transgression punishable by execution.

And since she was not warned, she could not be executed (Hilchot Sanhedrin 12:1-2). Hence, the witnesses were merely conspiring to cause her financial loss. Hence, that is the punishment they are subjected to.

I.e., in the same testimony, the witnesses mention both of these points. We are forced to say this, because the Rambam maintains (Chapter 10, Halachah 4) that the testimony of a lying witness is negated retroactively and he is disqualified from the time he testified in court. Otherwise, if the witnesses were disqualified because of their statements concerning theft, they would not be obligated with regard to their statements concerning the animal’s slaughter or sale (Radbaz, Kessef Mishneh).

Thus incurring the obligation to pay four of five times the worth of the animal (Exodus 21:37).

The double payment obligated of any thief.

Since it is their testimony which causes the defendant to be obligated for the greater amount, the lying witnesses are responsible to pay that amount when they are disqualified through hazamah.

For the testimony of the first pair of witnesses obligates him.

As stated in Chapter 5, Halachah 3, when the testimony of one witness is disqualified, the legal power of the entire testimony is nullified. Since the testimony concerning the slaughter or the sale is nullified, the thief is held liable only for the double payment associated with theft. The second pair of witnesses are not liable to pay, however, for financial responsibility is incurred only when both witnesses are disqualified through hazamah (Chapter 20, Halachah 1).

I.e., not only the testimony of the first pair of witnesses, but also the testimony of the second pair. Since the entire testimony is nullified, the defendant is under no financial obligation. And since only one witness was disqualified through hazamah, none of the witnesses are liable financially.

We do not have any definite knowledge that the presumed thief obtained the animal illegally. Perhaps the owner gave it to him and he slaughtered or sold an animal that belonged to him.

As stated in Hilchot Toen ViNitan 11:2, when a person claims that a field has been sold to him and produces witnesses who testify that he benefited from its produce for three consecutive years, he is presumed to be the owner.

For through their testimony, the plaintiff’s claim to the field would have been substantiated.

Each of the witnesses paying one sixth.

Since each pair of witnesses speaks about only one year, and the claim to the field is only established when all three testimonies are joined together, one might suppose that none of the testimonies is significant in its own right. Moreover, even if the witnesses claim that they did not come to testify about the ownership of the field, merely about to whom the crops belong, we reject their claim. The rationale is that they are aware that the plaintiff is claiming ownership over the entire field and using their testimony to support his claim (Bava Batra 56a).

And hence, the value of the field is divided among all of them equally and they are not obligated to make financial restitution unless they are all disqualified through hazamah.

Despite the fact that generally the testimony of two close relatives on one matter is not accepted, in this instance the testimony is accepted, because each brother is testifying regarding a separate matter.

As explained in Hilchot Nizkei Mammon, ch. 1, when an ox has a tendency to gore (mu'ad), the owner is obligated to pay full damages for any injury it causes. When an ordinary ox (tam) causes damage by goring, by contrast, the owner is required to pay only half the amount. Witnesses must testify that an ox caused damage by goring on three occasions for the status of an ox to change.

I.e., they are not liable to pay the full damages required when an ox which is mu’ad gores. They are, however, required to pay the half-damages required for testifying that an ordinary ox gored, as stated in Halachah 3.

Based on the gloss of the Kessef Mishneh, we interpret this to mean that they are obligated to pay the decrease in the value of the ox that was caused by it being deemed as mu'ad. For from this point on, the owner would be obligated to pay full damages rather than half damages.

Since they are motioning to each other, they are obviously one group who joined together with a common intent.

The fact that they come in direct succession indicates that their intent is to have the goring ox deemed as mu’ad and not to have its owner required to pay for the other damages it caused.

In this instance, it is obvious that their intent is not to obligate the owner to pay the half-damages for the goring of an ordinary ox. For damages caused by an ordinary ox are collected only from the body of the ox itself. Since the ox is not identified, one cannot say that the witnesses had that intent. Instead, they were seeking to establish that there is a goring ox in the owner’s herd. Once this is established, he is required to watch the entire herd, lest the goring ox damage other animals. See Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 10:3.

As required when an ordinary ox gores.

The wording is taken from Deuteronomy 21:18 which speaks of parents' efforts to discipline such a son. As explained in Hilchot Mamrim, ch. 7, if the son steals from his parents and buys a feast of meat and wine, they may bring him to court and have him lashed. The description of the theft by the witnesses is the first testimony mentioned in the present halachah. Afterwards, if he steals from his parents again for such a feast, they may have him executed. The description of the second theft is the second testimony mentioned here.

And nothing more. That was the outcome of their testimony.

They cannot say that they merely intended to have him lashed, because it is already public knowledge that he was lashed.

For the “wayward son” would not be executed unless their testimonies were combined. Hence, each of them is contributing to his execution and therefore, each deserves to be executed.

For, as indicated by Deuteronomy 24:7 (see Hilchot Geneivah, ch. 9), that is the punishment which would have been given the defendant.

Although each group is testifying only about half the matter, they are still given capital punishment for the reason the Rambam explains.

There is no separate punishment for kidnapping alone. Hence, by testifying that a person kidnapped, a witnesses is already beginning the legal process leading to his execution and there is no other purpose for his testimony.

I.e., they are not even given lashes for testifying falsely, for their testimony is of no consequence.

For the witnesses to the sale could claim that they did not know that witnesses to the kidnapping would appear.

Although in Halachah 8, the fact that witnesses motioned to one another is considered significant, a distinction can be made. Those laws involve only financial penalties and this case is one involving capital punishment. In the latter instance, we are far more stringent (Radbaz, Kessef Mishneh).

The Rambam is referring to a specific situation outlined in Deuteronomy 22:13-19 and described in detail in Hilchot Na'arah, ch. 3. A husband accuses his new wife of not being a virgin. If he also brings witnesses that she committed adultery after being consecrated, her infidelity is punishable by execution.

For they desired to have the woman executed. The fact that they also sought to have her deprived of the money due her by virtue of her ketubah is not significant. For they are not punished twice - capital punishment and making financial restitution - for a wrong against the same person. See Hilchot Na’arah 1:13-14.
The Kessef Mishneh notes that in Hilchot Chovel UMazik 8:12, the Rambam rules that when a pursuer destroys utensils even those belonging to people other than the pursued, he is not held liable financially because he is liable to be killed. A differentiation can be made between that ruling and the present instance, because here the lying witnesses are punished “as they conspired to do to their brother,” i.e., according to the punishment they desired each of the involved parties to suffer. See Tosafot, Ketubot 31a.

The 100 silver pieces which Deuteronomy 22:19 obligates the husband to pay.

The principle mentioned in note 53, that a person is not executed and held liable financially for the same transgression applies only when the obligations come about because of wrongs to the same person. In this instance, the witnesses sought to wrong different individuals - the witnesses and the husband - and they must receive the punishment they conspired to have each one given.

In which case, he is executed, as stated by Deuteronomy 22:23-24.

They are not required to pay the woman the money due her by virtue of her ketubah (see the following note). Sanhedrin 10a explains that this is speaking about a situation where the witnesses do not identify the woman at all in their testimony. Since she was not singled out, she would not have been held liable. Hence, the witnesses are not liable to her.

The Radbaz explains that this is speaking about a situation where, although it is not required, the husband wrote the woman a ketubah while she was consecrated, before she was married (see Hilchot Ishut 10:11). This is the “fine” that the woman would forfeit for engaging in relations.

The money is paid to her father, because he is granted any income his daughter deserves until she attains majority.
The witnesses are held liable for both capital punishment and a financial penalty, because two different people are involved: the financial penalty is for the woman’s father and capital punishment is for the man and the woman.

Since they did not identify the ox, it is obvious that the intent of their testimony was merely to have the accused sodomizer executed. Hence, that is the punishment they are given.

In which instance, the ox would also be executed because of their testimony (Leviticus 20:15). Thus the two punishments result from two different involved parties.