Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

I.e., we follow the principle: When a person desires to expropriate money from a colleague, the burden of proof is upon him.

A person whose genitalia are covered by flesh so that his (or her) gender cannot be discerned.

A person who has both male and female sexual organs.

The Kessef Mishneh emphasizes that the tumtum is given his sustenance as a daughter would be.

The rationale is that there is a doubt whether or not the tumtum or the androgynous are considered males and hence given the right to share in the inheritance of the estate. Since their status is doubtful, the son whose status as an heir is definite inherits the entire estate.

The status of the tumtum or the androgynous as males - and hence as sole heirs to the estate - is doubtful, as explained above. Hence, the daughters also have the status of a doubtful heir. Since the status of both is doubtful, they share equally.
The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 280:9) follow the same general principle, but arrive at different sets of figures. In a situation where a person leaves a tumtum and a daughter, and the estate is ample, they explain that the tumtum definitely receives half the estate, for even if the tumtum were a female, that share would be given. The doubt concerns the remaining half of the estate, and that half is divided equally. Thus the tumtum receives three fourths, and the daughters, a fourth. If the estate is not ample, and is hence used to sustain the daughters, the entire sustenance is granted to the daughters. For they can tell the tumtum: “Perhaps you are a male.”
With regard to an androgynous, the Tur and the Ramah rule that when an estate is ample, they agree that it should be divided equally between an androgynous and the daughters. And when it is not ample, the androgynous does not receive anything at all.

I.e., until the daughters reach the age of majority, they receive their food, clothing, medical expenses and other needs from their father’s estate (Hilchot Ishut, the latter portion of Chapter 19).

I.e., provide them with a dowry so that a man will desire to marry them. As explained in Hilchot Ishut, Chapter 20, a girl is given the dowry that we would have expected her father to give her from his estate. If we have no way of approximating what he would have given, we give her ten percent of the estate.

Hilchot Ishut 12:2, 19:10.

Thus, they are considered to be a debt incumbent on the estate.

When the estate is large enough to provide for the support of the sons and daughters until the daughters reach the age of majority (ibid. 19: 17).

This is somewhat of an overstatement. The amount necessary to support the daughters is taken from the estate and set aside. The remainder is given to the sons. Nevertheless, if there is only enough money in the estate to provide for the daughters’ sustenance, the entire estate should be designated for this purpose.

Or the androgynous. The Rambam is borrowing the wording of his source (Bava Batra 10:2).

Since the status of the tumtum is in doubt, the sons are not required to give him a share of the estate. Nevertheless, he is given his sustenance from the estate as the daughters are.
As mentioned above, the Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 280:9) approach these issues differently. They maintain that if there are limited funds in the estate, the daughters receive their sustenance before the tumtum does. Only when enough for the daughters’ sustenance has been set aside can the tumtum receive a share in the estate.

In this instance as well, since the tumtum’s status is doubtful, the daughters have this prerogative.

See Hilchot Gerushin 11:18, which requires a woman to wait this amount of time after divorce or her husband's death so that such a determination can be made.

Because of his death or due to divorce.

The Rambam is operating under the perspective that babies born in both the seventh and ninth months of pregnancy are viable. In contrast, a baby born in the eighth month of pregnancy is not considered a viable birth. It is questionable if these laws apply today, when it is possible to determine the term of a woman’s pregnancy far more easily.

Even if the father has no other sons, his other heirs are awarded the estate, for their claim· is definite, while this "son's" claim is a matter of doubt.

Without leaving children.

If the woman separated from her first husband because of divorce, he has the right to share in the inheritance of the "son." If their separation was caused by his death, that right is given to his heirs.

As is required to clarify that she was not pregnant when her husband died (Hilchot Yibbum VaChalitzah 1:19).

For if this son was fathered by the woman’s first husband, there is no requirement for yibbum. On the contrary, the widow is forbidden to marry her husband’s brother.

For we do not know whether he truly had the right to marry his brother’s widow and inherit his estate.

The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 163:3) rules that even if one of the claimants had already taken possession of the deceased brother’s estate, he must give half to the other claimant.

I.e., the brother who married the widow kept his brother’s estate as a separate entity and did not integrate it into his own financial holdings. After the second brother’s death, a question could arise between the sons who are certainly his and the son whose status is doubtful, concerning the right to the first brother’s estate.

The “son” whose status is doubtful can claim: “I am the only one who certainly has a claim to this estate.” For if he is the son of the first brother, the entire estate belongs to him and if he is the son of the second brother, a portion of the estate belongs to him.
This argument is not accepted, because his right to inherit the estate as the son of the brother who married the widow does not stem from his own claim to the estate. The other sons of that brother perpetuate their father’s claim. Hence this “son’s” claim is still considered of doubtful status.
The Tur (Even HaEzer 163) rules that the portion of the estate that this “son” would be given if he were a son of the brother who married the widow is granted him. The remainder of the estate is then divided equally. This opinion appears to be favored by the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit. 163:4).

I.e., those sons who are definitely his.

For if this person was not the son of the brother who married the widow, he is the son of his brother- and he alone, without sharing with the brother who married the widow - was entitled to inherit that estate.

Since his status is doubtful, they are not obligated to share the estate with him. And with regard to his claim regarding the remainder of the first brother’s estate, the source for this ruling, Yevamot 37b states that the case has been closed. Since that estate was already divided, we do not reopen the issue.
The Maggid Mishneh quotes the Rashba as questioning the law in the above instance, when a division of the first brother’s estate was not made: Is the argument mentioned by the Rambam accepted or not? Since the question was left unresolved, there is room to argue that the issue can be raised after the death of the brother who married the widow. See Tosafot, Yevamot, loc. cit.

I.e., Jacob had two sons: Reuven and Shimon. Reuven died and Shimon married his widow, who gave birth to a son, Dan, under the circumstances mentioned in Halachah 4. Afterwards, Jacob died. Shimon and Dan come to claim his estate.

As Jacob’s son, he definitely has a right to at least a portion of his estate.

His father’s share.

For a son does not receive a share when his father is alive.

Because the son whose status is doubtful does not have a definite share in the estate, he is not given a share at all.

Even if the brother who married the widow dies afterwards, the son whose status is doubtful cannot claim the portion of his grandfather’s estate due him. As mentioned in the conclusion of the last halachah, once such a ruling is given, the matter is not reopened.

For the estate becomes the property of the brother who married the widow and is divided into three equal shares, one for each of his three sons.

Each one receives a quarter, half of the half.

Thus, the son whose lineage is a matter of question receives 5/12 of the estate, and each of the brothers receives 7/24.
The rationale is that the portion that each claimant acknowledges as belonging to the other is given to him, and the remainder is divided in half. The rationale is that with regard to the remainder, neither has a definite claim.

Without leaving any heirs.

Since neither has a definite claim, the estate is divided between them.

Without leaving any other children.

Since neither has a definite claim, the estate is divided between them.
The text of the Mishneh Torah possessed by the Maggid Mishneh did not include this latter law. Hence it is placed in parenthesis. There is, however, no debate concerning whether it is correct, for it is an extension of the principles stated previously.

I.e., in an earthquake. To cite another contemporary example: A person and his wife were killed in a car accident. See also Halachah 9.

I.e., his sons from another wife or his father, brothers, or their heirs;

For her husband inherited her estate when she died (Chapter 1, Halachah 8), and when he died his heirs inherited it.

In which instance, his heirs do not have any claim to his wife's estate (Chapter 1, Halachah 12).

I.e., her sons from another husband or her father, brothers, or their heirs.

As explained in Hilchot Ishut, Chapter 16, the term nichsei m'log refers to property a woman brings to her household, which the husband is allowed to use until it is worthless. In the event of his death or the couple's divorce, the property is returned to the woman as is. The nichsei m'log are considered to be in the woman's possession. Therefore, her family's heirs acquire them.

As explained in Hilchot Ishut, Chapter 12, a husband obligates himself to pay his wife a minimum of 100 if she is not a virgin or 200 zuz if she is a virgin, in the event of his death or the couple's divorce.

Moreover, it was customary for an additional sum to be appended to the ketubah depending on the couple’s financial standing.

Since none of the money due her by virtue of her ketubah is due to the woman in her husband's lifetime. It is considered to be in the possession of the husband's heirs, and therefore is retained by them.

As explained (ibid., Chapter 16), the term nichsei tzon barzel refers to property a woman brings to her household, for which the husband accepts financial responsibility. It is evaluated at the outset, and a financial equivalent is established. In the event of his death or the couple's divorce, that sum must be paid to the woman.

Since the status of the nichsei tzon barzel is a matter of question, they are divided. See also similar concepts in Chapter 3, Halachah 9, and notes.

We are speaking about an instance where the woman is divorced or widowed. Thus, her son is her heir, and then after his death the inheritance should be given to his paternal family. If, however, he died first, then his mother's estate is given to her heirs from her father's household.

If the woman has another son, the term “definitely heirs” can be understood simply. He is certainly entitled to half of his mother’s estate. Hence, since the status of the claimants to the other half is doubtful, he inherits the entire estate.
If she does not have another son, the concept has a slightly different meaning in this instance from that in other cases of inheritance. Generally, it means that we know that the person has a right to the estate (which is not the case here, for if the mother died before the son, her paternal heirs do not have a right to her estate). In this instance, the intent is that while the woman was alive, the property was known to belong to that family. Hence, unless one has clear proof that the estate belongs to someone else, they should be allowed to retain possession. This interpretation, although followed by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 280:10), is somewhat problematic, for her heirs from her father’s household do not have a definite claim to the estate. Seemingly, the estate should be divided evenly between the two claimants. See the notes on the following halachah.

For the mother does not inherit her son's estate, nor does the son inherit his mother's estate after his death on behalf of his heirs (Chapter 1, Halachah 13).

Who is his closest heir.
Bava Batra 159b mentions the second clause in this halachah. The Rambam extrapolates that these laws would also apply in the situation he describes.

I.e., his paternal brothers who were born from a different mother.

Chapter 1, Halachah 13.

I.e., his brothers, his father, or his uncles.

For neither have a definite claim to the estate.
The Maggid Mishneh and the Rashba question the Rambam’s ruling, for it seems to contradict his ruling in the conclusion of the previous halachah. There, the Rambam ruIes that the estate remains in the possession of the mother’s heirs. On that basis, it would appear here that the estate should remain in the possession of the father’s heirs.
The Kessef Mishneh quotes a Responsum from Rabbenu Asher (Section 84, Responsum 3), which endeavors to resolve the difficulty, explaining that in this instance, the rights to the inheritance are passed to the daughter who has died. Since the rights are no longer in the possession of the person who passed away, there is room to rule that the inheritance should be transferred to others. [Many others do not accept that resolution.]
Rabbenu Asher himself admits that his resolution is weak and states that if one found authorities who rule that the father’s heirs should maintain possession, he would agree with them. His son, the Tur, indeed quotes such authorities and rules in that manner. This approach is followed by the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 280:11).

For the son’s heirs have no obligation to pay his debts from their own resources.

Since the son inherited his father’s estate, his own estate then has resources that can be used to pay his debts.

For their rights as heirs to the estate - whether from the son or the father - are definitely established.

The Siftei Cohen 280:3 states that this ruling applies according to the position that a creditor does not have a right to property that is fitting for an estate to acquire. There are, however, opinions that do not accept this thesis.

Today with the advances in modem communication, this question no longer applies, for it is possible to establish who died first.