Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

In contrast to laws involving capital punishment, as stated in Chapter 20, Halachah 1.

I.e., he denied a claim and was required to take an oath to substantiate his denial.

I.e., although generally, the word of one witness is not accepted, an exception is made in this case.

This term has a specific halachic meaning: A person who is disqualified from taking an oath, because he is known to have taken a false oath in the past or to have been disqualified to serve as a witness (Hilchot Toen ViNitan 2:2).

Although these individuals are not acceptable as formal witnesses, a judge may choose to rely on their word if he so desires. Ketubot 85a relates that Ravva accepted the word of his wife with regard to such a matter, for he was confident that she would not lie.

Whose testimony is not acceptable. The Rambam mentions only the testimony of non-acceptable witnesses in this instance, for if one acceptable witness testifies that a promissory note has been paid, the bearer must take an oath before expropriating payment even if the judge does not have feelings of certainty that his testimony is true (Hilchot Malveh ViLoveh 14:1).

The Ra’avad objects to this ruling, maintaining that the alleged creditor should not be given the opportunity to collect his claim, even with an oath. The Kessef Mishneh explains that the Rambam’s perspective is also reflected in the rulings of Rabbenu Chananel and Tosafot (Ketubot 85a). According to this view, the unique dimension of this teaching is that based on the judge’s trust, the woman or servant is given the same status as an acceptable witness. They are not, however, given greater credibility than that.

I.e., the debtor has sufficient financial resources to pay only one of the promissory notes.

He may not, however, destroy the promissory note and thus the bearer may take it to another judge who may decide to act upon it.

Without informing his family that the article had been entrusted to him (Ketubot 85b).

For if he would frequent the deceased's home, the fact that he could identify the article is not significant. He could have seen it during his visits.

Generally, heirs are given the benefit of the doubt. Although the heirs are not aware of the details, the court presents any argument that the deceased could have advanced on their behalf. Thus we might think that since the deceased could have claimed that the article belonged to him, that claim would be advanced on behalf of the heirs. This, however, is not the case, because the deceased did not have the means to own the article (Kessef Mishneh). The above ruling applies even when there are no witnesses that the alleged owner entrusted the article.

If, however, he does not have the means to own such an article, it is not given to him even though he identifies it, stating precise descriptive characteristics. Compare to Hilchot Sha’alah UPikadon 6:4, Hilchot Nachalot 11:1.

I.e., if we rely on the judges' discernment, why did the Torah require witnesses?

The Radbaz states that the Rambam’s wording implies that if the judge feels strongly that witnesses are lying, he may refuse to accept their testimony even if he has no firm proof to substantiate his assumptions. He may not say: “The perversion of justice is the witnesses’ responsibility; I am merely acting upon their testimony.” Instead, he must act according to his own scruples. See Halachah 3.

The Radbaz states that the Rambam’s statements are based on the rulings of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi and the Geonim who preceded him. They are quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 15:5. It must, however, be noted that in a responsa (Responsum 108), the Maharik writes that even in the present age, a judge should rely on his own appreciation of the truth. His words are cited by the Sefer Me’irat Einayim 15:15.

I.e., the testimony of at least two acceptable witnesses. In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo writes that, in contrast to the concepts mentioned previously, the reservation against expropriating property from orphans is not mentioned by Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi. Neither is it mentioned by Rabbenu Asher or the Tur. In his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 15:5), Rav Yosef Karo quotes the Rambam, but the Sefer Me’irat Einayim 15:16 questions why the Ramah does not cite the other view.

I.e., because he is only one witness, the judge could not decide the case according to his testimony unless he used the license mentioned in the previous halachah and, as stated above, this is not the practice at present. Hence, the judge should follow one of the courses of action mentioned by the Rambam.

See Chapter 22, Halachot 4-6, which explain the virtues of negotiating a compromise. These concepts are particularly relevant in the present age because of the decline in the level of the courts. See the Hagahot Maimoniot which elaborates on this issue; see also the notes to the following halachah.

As stated in the following halachah.

And is based on the testimony of witnesses who are lying.

See Hilchot Edut 1:4-5. Although generally, this cross-examination procedure is suspended in cases involving monetary law (Ibid. 3:1-2), a judge has the right to make an exception and employ these measures.

I.e., the cross-examination of the witnesses resolved the doubts that had initially troubled him.

The Hagahot Maimoniot and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 15:4) state this ruling applies when the plaintiff is a deceiver. Different rules apply if, however, it is the defendant who is a deceiver - and thus by withdrawing himself, the judge will allow the transgressor to get his way. For the money claimed will remain in the defendant’s possession. Instead, the judge should continue the process of cross-examination until the truth comes to the fore. Moreover, if he is a judge of stature, he may expropriate the funds from the defendant even if he has no proof that his assumptions are correct.
Even when it is the plaintiff who is the deceiver, Rabbenu Asher [and his conduct is cited as law by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 15:3)] would compose a court decision exonerating the defendant and preventing the plaintiff from pursuing the matter in other courts. The Sefer Me’irat Einayim 15:12 understands this to be a direct contradiction to the Rambam’s approach.

The Sefer Me'irat Einayim 15:11 offers two interpretations of this conclusion: a) God will assist him in delivering a just judgment and perceiving whether or not deception is involved. b) God sees into the person's heart. Therefore he cannot excuse himself by saying: "I did not perceive any injustice" when in fact he did.

According to the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 2:1), this applies even with regard to the courts of the present age. Some commentaries have questioned that ruling based on a comparison to the wording of the following halachah.

Similarly, they have right to impose fines (Ibid.; see Halachah 6).

The Sefer Me’irat Einayim 2:3 states that such decrees can be enforced even if the conduct of people at large is appropriate and it is only one individual who oversteps the ordinary bounds.

Allowing such licentious behavior would lead to immorality (Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 21:14).

The Greeks forbade the observance of the Sabbath. Our Sages feared that any laxity in its observance might have widespread repercussions among the people.

Who practiced witchcraft.

For all these reasons, we cannot say that Shimon ben Shetach sentenced them to death according to the requirements of law. Instead, he exercised the special dispensation granted judges, as the Rambam states.

Hilchot Sotah 2:14.

See Hilchot Talmud Torah, Chapter 7, which describes the nature of these bans and the restrictions they involve.

See Ibid., the conclusion of Chapter 6.

The court attendant should convey this message to the person being ostracized or being excommunicated, so that he will realize that the action was taken by a judge of stature and hence, he will hurry to amend his conduct (Kessef Mishneh).

This malediction was pronounced by the prophetess Deborah in her song of victory after the defeat of the Canaanites. She cursed Meroz, an important personage of that time, because although he lived near the battlefield, he did not join Barak's troops (Radak). The Rambam cites this (quoting Mo'ed Kattan 16a) as an example of the fact that the transgression performed by the person must be publicized.

These activities were performed by Nechemiah to influence the people to send away the gentile wives they had taken.

This is a somewhat unique ruling on the Rambam’s part, for no where else in the Torah literature is the concept of imprisonment mentioned. Although the Rambam’s ruling is based on the interpretation of the verse from Ezra in Mo’ed Kattan 16a, Rashi - in both his commentary on the Tanach and on the Talmud - interprets the phrase as referring to binding a person to the pillar against which he is lashed. See also Hilchot Malveh ViLoveh 2:1 which states that a person should not be imprisoned for financial matters and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 97:15) who allows such a practice.

The king of Persia granted Ezra permission to punish transgressors as he saw fit. The Rambam’s ruling is based on the interpretation of the verse in Mo’ed Kattan, loc. cit.

Our translation is based on the gloss of the Bayit Chadash (Choshen Mishpat 2) who explains that at times, such measures are employed because of the severity of the individual’s actions and at times, because of the climate in the society at large.

I.e., there should not be any sense of personal vendetta, heaven forbid.

For example, see Hilchot Evel 3:14 which states that in order to show honor to people at large, a priest is granted license to enter into an area which is ordinarily forbidden for him according to Rabbinic Law as a safeguard to the prohibitions involving ritual impurity. See also Hilchot Kilayim 10:29.

Avos 4:8. In his Commentary to the Mishnah, the Rambam interprets the phrase “honors the Torah” as meaning “honors its commandments by showing eagerness to fulfill them, honors its scholars who carry its [standard], and honors the texts composed about it.”