Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day
Edut - Chapter 1
Edut - Chapter 1
See the definition of this term in Chapter 18.
I.e., it is statements made in court that are significant. Statements made outside the court, by contrast, are of no consequence (Kessef Mishneh).
Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 178) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 122) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
I.e., one’s fellow Jew. If, however, one knows of testimony that will benefit a gentile, one is not obligated to testify in court (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 28:2). See Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 28:3) which discusses the concept of testifying on behalf of a gentile at length.
If a person does not testify and as a result, his colleague loses money, the recalcitrant witness has a moral and spiritual obligation (chayav bidinei shamayim) to reimburse his colleague for his loss [Bava Kama 55b; Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 28:1)].
With regard to testimony involving the Torah’s prohibitions and cases involving capital punishment or lashes, by contrast, a witness is obligated to testify even when he is not summoned (Kessef Mishneh).
If, however, the litigant does not summon him, he is not required to volunteer the information on his own initiative. Sh’vuot 35a derives this concept from the exegesis of the verse from Leviticus which the Rambam cites.
From the Rambam’s wording, it can be implied that even when there is only one witness, he is obligated to testify in court (Kessef Mishneh). Although his testimony does not have the power to cause money to be expropriated from the litigant, it may require him to take an oath or intimidate him into admitting his obligation. See also Chapter 21, Halachah 10.
The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 28:5) states that the court should send three representatives to him and he should testify in their presence. In that manner, the testimony is delivered in the presence of a court and the scholar’s honor is preserved.
See Hilchot Talmud Torah 6:1 which describes the mitzvah to honor the Sages.
E.g., a woman who seeks permission from the court to remarry and the witness knows whether or not her husband is alive (Rashi, Sh’vuot 30b). The scholar is obligated to testify if the court wishes to grant leniency and he knows that there is a prohibition involved. If, however, the court seeks to rule stringently and he knows that there is no need for a prohibition, he is not required to testify (Kessef Mishneh). The Sefer Me’irat Einayim 28:28 explains that there are even times when the court seeks to be stringent that the person should testify, because the stringency may lead to leniency indirectly.
When there is only one witness, he is obligated to testify only when his testimony will prevent a person from transgressing (or continuing to transgress). If, however, the transgression has been performed and his testimony will be of no consequence, he should not testify. Indeed, doing so resembles malicious gossip (Hagahot Maimoniot to Chapter 5, Halachah 1).
He must testify regardless of whether his testimony will lead to conviction or acquittal (Kessef Mishneh).
And every transgression involves the desecration of God’s name.
I.e., the kings of the House of David. The kings of the Kingdom of Israel and the like, by contrast, should not be brought to court (Hilchot Sanhedrin 2:5). Alternatively, it could refer also to the King of Israel and be referring to a case involving the king’s son (Radbaz).
Note the gloss of Rav Moshe HaCohen who asks why the Rambam does not mention an instance where the High Priest’s testimony is necessary to prevent a transgression, for in such an instance, even the High Priest is required to testify. For it appears that the Rambam would not require a High Priest to testify in such circumstances.
Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 179) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 463) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. As stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 1, according to Scriptural Law, this obligation applies with regard to all matters brought to court, cases involving financial matters as well as those involving capital punishment.
Sanhedrin 40a derives the need for these seven fundamental questions from the exegesis of three verses (Deuteronomy 13:15, 17:4, and 19:18) which deal with the judges’ examination of the witnesses.
The reason for these questions is to divert the witnesses' attention and cause them to let down their guard, lest they have prepared false testimony (Rashi, Sanhedrin 32a).
I.e., did it have the minimum amount necessary for him to be liable (see Hilchot Sh’vitat Asor 2:1-5).
See the definition of this term in Chapter 18. As explained there, hazamah involves other witnesses stating that these witnesses were with them in another place at the time they claim to have observed the transgression taking place.
Sanhedrin 41 a states: “Whenever there is no possibility of refuting testimony through hazamah, the testimony is of no consequence.” For testimony must include the definition of the essential factors involved in a case. Otherwise, there is no way of proving its authenticity.
See the following chapter which elaborates on the differences between the bedikot and the chakirot.
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