Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day - Daily Torah Study

1The following laws apply whenever a judge adjudicates a case involving financial matters and errs. If his error involves matters that are revealed and known - e.g., a law that is explicitly stated in the Mishnah or the Gemara, the ruling is reversed. The situation is returned to its original status and the judgment required by halachah is rendered. If it is impossible to return the matter to its original status, e.g., the person who unwarrantedly received the money traveled overseas, or he was a stubborn and strong person, the judge is not liable. Although he caused a loss, he did not have the intent of doing so. Similar laws apply if a judge ruled that a substance that was pure was impure,1 that an animal that was kosher was unacceptable and had it fed to the dogs, or the like.אכָּל דַּיָּן שֶׁדָּן דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת וְטָעָה: אִם טָעָה בִּדְבָרִים הַגְּלוּיִין וְהַיְּדוּעִין, כְּגוֹן דִּינִין הַמְּפֹרָשִׁין בַּמִּשְׁנָה אוֹ בַּתַּלְמוּד - חוֹזֵר הַדִּין וּמַחֲזִירִין הַדָּבָר כְּשֶׁהָיָה מִקֹּדֶם, וְדָנִין בּוֹ כַּהֲלָכָה. וְאִם אִי אֶפְשָׁר לְהַחֲזִיר, כְּגוֹן שֶׁהָלַךְ זֶה שֶׁנָּטַל הַמָּמוֹן שֶׁלֹּא כַּדִּין לִמְדִינַת הַיָּם, אוֹ שֶׁהָיָה אַלָּם, אוֹ שֶׁטִּמֵּא דָּבָר הַטָּהוֹר, אוֹ שֶׁהוֹרָה בַּכְּשֵׁרָה שֶׁהִיא טְרֵפָה וְהֶאֱכִילָהּ לַכְּלָבִים, וְכַיּוֹצֵא בְּזֶה - הֲרֵי זֶה פָּטוּר מִלְּשַׁלֵּם; אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁגָּרַם לְהֶזֵּק, לֹא נִתְכַּוֵּן לְהַזִּיק.

2Different principles apply if the judge errs in a case requiring a decision to be made by using one’s logic to weigh alternative positions,2 for example, a case arose involving the subject of a difference of opinion among the Sages of the Mishnah or the Sages of the Gemara where it was not explicitly stated whose opinion the halachah follows. The judge decided to follow one opinion without knowing it had already been universally established practice within the Torah community to follow the other view. In such a situation, if the judge was an expert who had been given license to adjudicate cases by the exiliarch, or even if he had not been given such license, but the litigants voluntarily accepted him as their judicial authority, the ruling is reversed. The rationale is that he is an expert.בטָעָה בְּשִׁקּוּל הַדַּעַת, כְּגוֹן דָּבָר שֶׁהוּא מַחֲלֹקֶת תַּנָּאִים אוֹ אֲמוֹרָאִים, וְלֹא נִפְסְקָה הֲלָכָה כְּאֶחָד מֵהֶן בְּפֵרוּשׁ, וְעָשָׂה כְּאֶחָד מֵהֶן, וְלֹא יָדַע שֶׁכְּבָר פָּשַׁט הַמַּעֲשֶׂה בְּכָל הָעוֹלָם כְּדִבְרֵי הָאַחֵר: אִם הָיָה זֶה הַדַּיָּן מֻמְחֶה, וְנוֹטֵל רְשׁוּת מֵרֹאשׁ גָּלוּת, אוֹ שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה נוֹטֵל רְשׁוּת אֲבָל קִבְּלוּ אוֹתוֹ בַּעֲלֵי דִּינִין עֲלֵיהֶן - הוֹאִיל וְהוּא מֻמְחֶה, חוֹזֵר הַדִּין.

If the ruling cannot be reversed, he is not liable to make restitution. This applies both to a judge who received permission from the exiliarch or one received permission from a Jewish court to adjudicate cases in Eretz Yisrael, but not to serve as judge in the diaspora, as explained.וְאִם אִי אֶפְשָׁר לְהַחֲזִיר, פָּטוּר מִלְּשַׁלֵּם. אֶחָד הַנּוֹטֵל רְשׁוּת מֵרֹאשׁ גָּלוּת אוֹ הַנּוֹטֵל רְשׁוּת מִבֵּית דִּין שֶׁל יִשְׂרָאֵל בְּאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל, אֲבָל לֹא בְּחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ, כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ.

3Different rules apply if the person who erred in a question of logical deduction was an expert judge, but he had not received license to adjudicate cases, nor was he accepted by the litigants as an authority, or was not an expert, but was accepted by the litigants to adjudicate their case according to Torah law. If he personally took property from one litigant and gave it to the other, his actions are irreversible and he should pay the damages from his own resources.3 If, however, he did not personally take the property from one and give it to the other, the decision should be reversed. If the decision cannot be reversed, he should pay the damages from his own resources.4גהָיָה הַטּוֹעֶה מֻמְחֶה, וְלֹא נָטַל רְשׁוּת וְלֹא קִבְּלוּ אוֹתוֹ בַּעֲלֵי דִּינִין עֲלֵיהֶן, אוֹ שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה מֻמְחֶה אֲבָל קִבְּלוּ אוֹתוֹ בַּעֲלֵי דִּינִין עֲלֵיהֶן לָדוּן לָהֶן כַּדִּין, וְטָעָה בְּשִׁקּוּל הַדַּעַת: אִם נָשָׂא וְנָתַן בַּיָּד, מַה שֶׁעָשָׂה עָשׂוּי וִישַׁלֵּם מִבֵּיתוֹ. וְאִם לֹא נָשָׂא וְנָתַן בַּיָּד, יַחֲזֹר הַדִּין, וְאִם אִי אֶפְשָׁר לַחֲזֹר, יְשַׁלֵּם מִבֵּיתוֹ.

4When, however, a person who is not an expert and was not accepted by the litigants adjudicates a case, even though he was given permission to act as a judge,5 he is considered as one of the men of force and not as a proper judge. Therefore, the judgment he renders is of no consequence. This applies whether he erred or whether he did not err. Either one of the litigants may withdraw and have the case adjudicated by a proper court.דאֲבָל מִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ מֻמְחֶה, וְלֹא קִבְּלוּ אוֹתוֹ בַּעֲלֵי דִּינִין, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנָּטַל רְשׁוּת - הֲרֵי זֶה בִּכְלַל בַּעֲלֵי זְרוֹעַ, וְאֵינוֹ בִּכְלַל הַדַּיָּנִין. לְפִיכָךְ אֵין דִּינָיו דִּין, בֵּין טָעָה בֵּין לֹא טָעָה. וְכָל אֶחָד מִבַּעֲלֵי דִּינִין - אִם רָצָה, חוֹזֵר וְדָן בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין.

If such a judge erred and personally gave property from one litigant to the other, he is obligated to pay from his own resources. He may then regain the money from the litigant to whom he gave property unlawfully. If one litigant paid the other because of the ruling of such a judge and the recipient is unable to return the money or if the judge rendered an object ritually impure or gave meat that was kosher to the dogs to eat, the judge must bear the loss as is the law regarding anyone who causes damages. For such a person has the intent of causing damages.וְאִם טָעָה, וְנָשָׂא וְנָתַן בַּיָּד - חַיָּב לְשַׁלֵּם מִבֵּיתוֹ, וְחוֹזֵר וְלוֹקֵחַ מִבַּעַל דִּין זֶה שֶׁנָּתַן לוֹ שֶׁלֹּא כַּהֲלָכָה. וְאִם אֵין לוֹ לְהַחֲזִיר, אוֹ שֶׁטִּמֵּא, אוֹ שֶׁהֶאֱכִיל דָּבָר הַמֻּתָּר לַכְּלָבִים - יְשַׁלֵּם כְּדִין כָּל גּוֹרֵם לְהַזִּיק, שֶׁזֶּה מִתְכַּוֵּן לְהַזִּיק הוּא.

5When a judge errs and obligates a person who is not required to take an oath to do so, and in order to free himself from the obligation to take the oath,6 this person negotiated a compromise with the other litigant, the compromise may be revoked. Even though he affirmed the compromise with a kinyan, it is of no substance. He agreed to pay or to waive the other person’s liability only to free himself from the oath to which the judge who erred obligated him. And whenever a kinyan is carried out on the basis of an error, it is annulled. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.הדַּיָּן שֶׁטָּעָה, וְחִיֵּב שְׁבוּעָה לְמִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ חַיָּב בָּהּ, וְעָשָׂה זֶה פְּשָׁרָה עִם בַּעַל דִּינוֹ כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יִשָּׁבַע, וְאַחַר כָּךְ יָדַע שֶׁאֵינוֹ בֶּן שְׁבוּעָה, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁקָּנוּ מִיָּדוֹ עַל הַפְּשָׁרָה - אֵינָהּ כְּלוּם; שֶׁלֹּא קִבֵּל עָלָיו לִתֵּן לוֹ אוֹ לִמְחֹל לוֹ, אֶלָא כְּדֵי שֶׁיִּפָּטֵר מִשְּׁבוּעָה שֶׁחִיְּבוֹ בָּהּ הַטּוֹעֶה, וְכָל קִנְיָן בְּטָעוּת, חוֹזֵר. וְכֵן כֹּל כַיּוֹצֵא בְּזֶה.

6When two people are involved in a dispute concerning a judgment, one states: “Let us have the matter judged here,” and the other says, “Let us ascend to the Supreme Court, lest these judges err and expropriate money contrary to the law,” we compel the latter litigant to have the matter adjudicated locally. If he asks the judges: “Write down the rationale why you have rendered this judgment against me and give it to me, lest you have erred,” they must write down their rationale and give him the transcript. Afterwards, they expropriate what he owes.7ושְׁנַיִם שֶׁנִּתְעַצְּמוּ בַּדִּין - אֶחָד אוֹמֵר 'נָדוּן כָּאן', וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר 'נַעֲלֶה לְבֵית דִּין הַגָּדוֹל שֶׁמָּא יִטְעוּ אֵלּוּ הַדַּיָּנִין וְיוֹצִיאוּ מָמוֹן שֶׁלֹּא כַּדִּין' - כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ וְדָן בְּעִירוֹ. וְאִם אָמַר 'כִּתְבוּ וּתְנוּ לִי מֵאֵיזֶה טַעַם דַּנְתּוּנִי, שֶׁמָּא טְעִיתֶם' - כּוֹתְבִים וְנוֹתְנִין לוֹ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ מוֹצִיאִין מִמֶּנּוּ.

If the local judges feel the need to ask for clarification regarding a matter from the Supreme Court in Jerusalem, they should write down their question and send it. After their inquiry, the judgment should be rendered in the local court on the basis of the answer written to them by the Supreme Court.וְאִם הֻצְרַךְ דָּבָר לִשְׁאֹל מִבֵּית דִּין הַגָּדוֹל שֶׁבִּירוּשָׁלַיִם - כּוֹתְבִין וְשׁוֹלְחִין וְשׁוֹאֲלִין, וְדָנִין לָהֶם בְּעִירָם כְּפִי מַה שֶׁיָּבוֹא בִּכְתָב בֵּית דִּין הַגָּדוֹל.

7When does the above8 apply? With regard to judgments dependent on claims issued by both litigants9 or a situation when a lender desires to have the case adjudicated locally and the borrower says: “Let us go to the Supreme Court.” If, by contrast, the lender says: “Let us go to the Supreme Court,” We compel the borrower to ascend with the lender, as implied by Proverbs 22:7: “A borrower is a servant to the lender.” Similarly, if a person claims that his colleague injured or damaged his person or his property or stole from him, and the plaintiff desires to ascend to the Supreme Court, the local court compels the defendant to ascend together with him. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.זבַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? בִּשְׁאָר הַדִּינִין שֶׁזֶּה טוֹעֵן וְזֶה טוֹעֵן, אוֹ בְּשֶׁאָמַר הַמַּלְוֶה 'נָדוּן כָּאן' וְהַלּוֹוֶה אוֹמֵר 'נֵלֵךְ לְבֵית דִּין הַגָּדוֹל'. אֲבָל אִם אָמַר הַמַּלְוֶה 'נֵלֵךְ לְבֵית דִּין הַגָּדוֹל' - כּוֹפִין אֶת הַלּוֹוֶה וְעוֹלֶה עִמּוֹ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר "עֶבֶד לֹוֶה לְאִישׁ מַלְוֶה" (משלי כב, ז). וְכֵן אִם טָעַן זֶה שֶׁהִזִּיקוֹ אוֹ גְּזָלוֹ, וְרָצָה הַטּוֹעֵן לַעֲלוֹת - כּוֹפִין בֵּית דִּין שֶׁבְּעִירוֹ אֶת הַנִּטְעָן לַעֲלוֹת עִמּוֹ. וְכֵן כֹּל כַיּוֹצֵא בְּזֶה.

8When does the above10 apply? When the person from whom property was stolen, the person who suffered injury or damage, or the lender has witnesses or proof that support his claim. When, however, his claim is unsupported, we do not obligate the defendant to leave his locale. Instead, he takes an oath there and is freed of obligation. חבַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? בְּשֶׁהָיוּ שָׁם עֵדִים אוֹ רְאָיָה לַנִּגְזָל אוֹ לַנִּזָּק אוֹ לַמַּלְוֶה; אֲבָל טַעֲנָה רֵיקָנִית, אֵין מְחַיְּבִין אֶת הַנִּטְעָן לָצֵאת כְּלָל, אֶלָא נִשְׁבָּע בִּמְקוֹמוֹ, וְנִפְטָר.

9Similar concepts apply in the present age, when there is no Supreme Court, but there are places where there are great sages whose expertise is renowned and there are other places where there are scholars who are not on that level. If the lender says: “Let us go to this-and-this place in this-and-this land to have the case adjudicated by so-and-so, the great sage,” we compel the borrower to go with him. This was the practice continually in Spain.טוְכֵן הַדִּין בַּזְּמַן הַזֶּה, שֶׁאֵין שָׁם בֵּית דִּין גָּדוֹל, אֲבָל יֵשׁ מְקוֹמוֹת שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהֶן חֲכָמִים גְּדוֹלִים מֻמְחִין לָרַבִּים, וּמְקוֹמוֹת שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהֶן תַּלְמִידִים שֶׁאֵינָן כְּמוֹתָן, אִם אָמַר הַמַּלְוֶה 'נֵלֵךְ לְמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי שֶׁבְּאַרְצוֹ לִפְנֵי פְּלוֹנִי הַגָּדוֹל, וְנָדוּן לְפָנָיו בְּדִין זֶה' - שֶׁכּוֹפִין אֶת הַלּוֹוֶה, וְהוֹלֵךְ עִמּוֹ. וְכָּךְ הָיוּ מַעֲשִׂים בְּכָל יוֹם בִּסְפָרַד.

Footnotes

One might ask: What is the difficulty? Since the judge was informed of the error, he could merely reverse his ruling? For this reason, the Sefer Me'irat Einayim 25:3 explains that we are speaking about a situation where the judge ruled that a substance that was in fact pure was impure, and because of that ruling, the owner placed it in a setting where actually became impure.

We have given an almost literal translation to the term shikul hadaat. The intent is a judgment call, rather than a decision for which there is an explicit Talmudic ruling. In the future, we will translate it as "logical deduction."

I.e., he is considered as a person who caused damages. With regard to an expert judge since he did not have the authority to call the litigants to judgment or their consent for judging them, he is held liable. For deciding to adjudicate a case in such a situation is equivalent to accepting responsibility in the event of error.
A judge who is not an expert has a more encompassing responsibility. Since he knows that he is not an expert, the very fact that he consents to judge involves accepting responsibility for his mistakes. For he is aware of his limitations and knows that he might err. Nevertheless, he is not held liable for a mistake regarding an explicit law. The rationale is that this is considered like an ones, a factor beyond his control. Since he would not be expected to make an error concerning such a matter, it is not taken for granted that he accepts responsibility (Lechem Mishneh).

The Kessef Mishneh explains that the Rambam's ruling depends on the principle hefker beit din hefker, that the court has the right to expropriate property from an individual. When is that principle applied, however? When expert judges are empowered to act as a court or explicitly asked to do so by the litigants. Hence when they are not so empowered and when consent was not granted them by the litigants, they are personally responsible.

This is possible, because the exiliarchs were not necessarily paradigms of ethical excellence.

For because of the severity involved in taking an oath, many people would rather give in slightly and negotiate a compromise, rather than invoke God's name, even when their claim is justified.

The litigant may show the transcript to other authorities and if they discover an error, the judges' ruling may be reversed according to the principles stated in the previous halachot.

That one litigant can compel another to have a case adjudicated locally.

E.g., disputes concerning the ownership of property, or other instances where there is neither a plaintiff and a defendant, but two litigants with neither having established a claim of ownership with regard to a property or a privilege.

10.

That we compel a defendant to ascend with the plaintiff.

Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

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