Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

For the testimony must be given in the presence of the defendant.

I.e., are you certain of his identity? Perhaps you are confusing him with someone else. This is the Rambam’s interpretation of Sanhedrin 40a. Rashi interprets that passage differently (Lechem Mishneh).

See the following halachah.

The Rambam’s ruling reflects a unique instance in which he uses the wording of a Talmudic passage for the opposite intent. Sanhedrin 8b quotes Rabbi Yossi bar Rabbi Yehudah as coining the expression the Rambam employs: “A warning was instituted only to make a distinction between a person who transgresses inadvertently and one who transgresses intentionally.” Rabbi Yossi, however, used this concept as support for his contention that a Torah scholar does not need a warning. Since he is knowledgeable, we assume that he is familiar with the laws. If he is transgressing, we can conclude that he is doing so as a conscious act of rebellion. Hence, he is deserving of punishment.
The Rambam differs, maintaining that even a Torah scholar might not be aware that his act violates a particular prohibition. We do not suspect that he did not know the law, it was however possible that he was aware of the prohibition, but did not know that it applied in this instance, e.g., he knew that fat is forbidden, but did not know that a particular piece of meat contained forbidden fat. The warning will clarify that for him (Kessef Mishneh; Maggid Mishneh, Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 1:3).

He does not, however, need to be told the type of execution he will receive.

For he did not transgress.

By an earthly court. Although it appears that he acknowledged the warning and transgressed intentionally, we do not execute him for we are not certain that this is so unless he makes an explicit statement to this effect. We are not concerned that a person who is obligated to be executed may be released. For even if he is not punished by an earthly court, God will execute judgment upon him.

I.e., the time it takes to say Shalom Alecha Rebbe Umori (Hilchot Sh’vuot 2:17).

Otherwise, it is possible that he forgot the warning (Sanhedrin 40b). Although this is highly unlikely, this is another one of the leniencies given to insure that an innocent person is never executed.

Who are not acceptable to serve as witnesses.

Makkot 6b states that even if the person heard the warning from a demon, it is sufficient. The Rambam, who maintained that demons no longer exist in the present time, however, omitted this concept (Radbaz).

I.e., the person committing the transgression (Kessef Mishneh). Rashi (Makkot 6b) interprets this as referring to the victim.

I.e., administers a severe warning, so that if a person was considering giving false testimony, he will recant. Hilchot Edut 17:2 describes a warning given with regard to financial matters, but it is not as severe.

Something that you did not actually see, but presume to be true. For example, a person walked out of a room with a bloody knife and a victim was found slain inside. Although the likelihood is great that the person carrying the knife was the murderer, this is considered as circumstantial evidence and may not be used to convict the defendant.

Hearsay evidence, even from a totally reliable source, is inadmissible. Instead, the person who saw the crime being committed must testify himself.

The precise meaning of the Hebrew words derishah vichakirah is discussed in Hilchot Edut, Chapters 1 and 2.

God was holding Cain responsible, not only for the death of Abel, but for the destruction of all his descendants.

I.e., in contrast to all the animals which were created in pairs, Adam was created alone.

Implied by the above are two concepts: a) the importance of every life; that the witnesses should take seriously the consequences involved in having the defendant executed; b) the responsibility the witnesses have upon them, for “the entire world” depends on them.

With these statements, the judges counsel the witnesses against refraining from testifying. They might feel that even though they know incriminating evidence, they will refrain from testifying, because of the difficulty and the responsibility involved.

I.e., the Torah commands a person to give testimony if he saw a colleague commit a transgression. This is one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah, as stated in Hilchot Edut 1:1.

I.e., God will be happy because of their execution. See also Hilchot Evel 1:10.

And still desire to testify despite hearing this warning.

Chapter 1, Halachah 4.

I.e., he describes the event, the date, and the time at which it took place (ibid.:5).

If there is a discrepancy between the testimony of any of the witnesses, the testimony of all of them is nullified (Hilchot Edut 2:3).

Chapter 10, Halachah 7.

As a source, the Or Sameach cites Numbers 15:34 which relates how the person who collected sticks on the Sabbath was imprisoned until God revealed how he would be executed.

They do not fast, so that their minds will be clear, but they are careful not to overindulge. This is a sign of deference to the seriousness of the judgment they are undertaking. For this reason, they do not drink at all. Needless to say, they would not eat and drink to the extent that their thoughts would be blurred.
Sanhedrin 42a derives this concept based on Proverbs 31:4: “The princes should not [partake of] strong drink.” The Hebrew for princes, roznim, shares the same root as the Hebrew word raz, meaning “secret.” “Those involved in the secrets of the world [- i.e., questions of life and death -] should not partake of strong drink.”

Chapter 10, Halachah 5.

See Chapter 1, Halachah 9.

As explained in Chapter 9, Halachot 2-3.

He is not left to languish under the distress of a death sentence as stated in the following halachah.

As evident from Chapter 13, Halachah 1, one of the reasons for th is was to allow the possibility of a rationale acquitting the defendant to be discovered. Another rationale is mentioned by Sanhedrin 42b: so that the judges will not appear to be anxious to carry out the execution.

The verse concludes describing how the blasphemer would be stoned to death there.

A mil is 2000 cubits, approximately a kilometer in contemporary measure.

The camp of the Jewish people was 12 mil long and the Tent of Meeting was in the center. Thus the distance from Moses’ tent to the camp’s periphery was slightly less than 6 mil.

In this context, the fetus is considered as part of the mother’s body and not as an independent entity (Rashi, Arachin, loc. cit.)..

If the fetus is not killed first, it may emerge after the woman’s death and that would result in the denigration of her corpse (Rashi, Arachin,7a).

For the fetus has already taken on the status of an independent entity (ibid.).

As the Rambam states in Hilchot Evel 14:21, it is forbidden to benefit from a corpse. Nevertheless, an exception exists with regard to the hair of the corpse, for it is not considered as part of the corpse. Arachin 7b explains the rationale for this exception: Every other portion of the corpse will change after death; the hair, by contrast, will remain the same.
In the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Arachin 1:4), he states that this exception applies when before her death, the woman said that her hair should be given to another person. If she did not make such a statement, it is forbidden to benefit from her hair as well. He does not, however, make such a stipulation in Hilchot Evel.
It must be mentioned that the Rambam’s ruling in Hilchot Evel has been questioned by the commentaries. In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo raises objections, and in his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 349:2), he states that it is forbidden to benefit from the hair of a corpse. According to his interpretation, the leniency derived from Arachin, loc. cit., with regard to the hair of a condemned woman is that, even though she has been condemned to death, until she is executed her hair may be cut off and used.

A burnt offering, by contrast, is offered even after the person’s death (Arachin 7b).

Our assumption is that it is more desirable for him to be executed immediately than to wait for the sacrificed to be offered. We do not offer such sacrifices after his death, for once a person has passed away, these sacrifices cannot procure atonement for him. These laws are restated in Hilchot Shegagot 3:12.