Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

The Rambam chooses such an instance because if both litigants are harsh, the one vindicated will defend the judge against the other litigant (see Tosafot, Sanhedrin 6b). The Radbaz explains that this is unlikely; no litigant will risk his own welfare to defend a judge. Instead the Rambam is referring to a common situation. The same principles apply if both litigants are harsh. The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 12:1) differs and maintains that if both litigants are harsh, the judge is obligated to adjudicate the case.

The verse continues: “for the judgment is God’s.” Implied is that the command applies at the time of judgment (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 12:2).
Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 276) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 415) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

For the community will protect him (Radbaz).

See Chapter 1, Halachah 7, which states that students should sit before the court.

Similarly, the law applies in a situation when both litigants are poor or both rich (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 9:18).

And allows the judge to decide the case without considering that factor.

For in this way, the student will not be able to inform him if he deviates from the proper path [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 9:6)].

Our translation is based on authoritative manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah. The version in the standard printed text is slightly different.

Instead, in a reverent manner, he should ask: “Master, did you not teach us such and such?” [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 9:8)]. See also Hilchot Talmud Torah 5:9.

Pesharah, the Hebrew term for compromise, is derived from poshrin, meaning “lukewarm water.” Just as water is brought to that temperature by mixing hot and cold water together, the court negotiates a compromise by taking into consideration the perspectives of both litigants (the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, Ketubot 10:5). It must, however, be emphasized that a compromise is negotiated through the guiding influence of a judge who knows the legal principles involved. Unlike a judgment which must remain true to those principles without bending an inch, in a compromise, there is room for flexibility. Nevertheless, the basis for the compromise is the Torah’s guidelines.

See the Introduction to the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah where he mentions similar concepts.

For generally, judgment does not lead to peace. The litigant who loses the case will think that he has been wronged.

For generally, a judgment is not charitable. Instead it should be executed without consideration of the situation of the litigant who loses.

The Sefer Me’irat Einayim 12:9 states that even though the litigant whose claim would have been vindicated will forgo a certain amount of financial gain, it is considered to his advantage to negotiate a compromise. For the benefits of peace and goodwill outweigh the financial loss.

I.e., the judgment should be executed regardless of the difficulties.
The Radbaz and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 12:2) state that a compromise can be negotiated even after the judgment has been rendered if an oath is involved and the judges fear that a false oath might be taken. The Siftei Cohen quotes the Shiltei Giborim who rules that the judges cannot impose an arbitrated compromise settlement after the judgment has been rendered. Nevertheless, if the judges suggest a settlement and it is accepted by the litigants, it is binding.

Although the litigants agreed to a compromise, if they did not affirm their agreement with a kinyan, their agreement is not binding and they can retract [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 12:7)]. Hence the judges have the authority to push towards a judgment in the hope that this will compel the parties to agree on a compromise.

But a judgment rendered by three ordinary people is binding in most instances as stated in Chapter 2, Halachah 10.

The Rambam uses a plural form. The Radbaz explains that this form was employed only for literary reasons, so that the second clause will parallel the first. If, however, one expert judge negotiated a compromise, it is also binding. In his Kessef Mishneh, however, Rav Yosef Caro cites opinions that require two judges and in his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 12:7), he cites both views.

The narrative is related in Sanhedrin 31a.

So that he has the possibility of taking it a higher court for review; see Chapter 6, Halachah 6, and notes. In this halachah, the Rambam is focusing only on the manner in which the text of the record is composed, emphasizing how - in keeping with the statements of the previous halachah - the opinions should not be associated with the judges by name.

This wording indicates that there was a difference of opinion among the judges, but allows each to preserve his anonymity. The Sefer Me’irat Einayim 19:3 states that if the judges of the court are unanimous in their decision, it is sufficient to say: “So-and-so was vindicated” or “So-and-so was held liable.”

The Bayit Chadash (Choshen Mishpat 18) states that this refers to the litigants and the witness. Others, however, may stay. Indeed, it is desirable for the students of the judges to remain to listen to the debate and offer suggestions as indicated by Halachot 2 and 3. The Pitchei Teshuvah (Choshen Mishpat 18:1) clarifies the intent of the Bayit Chadash, stating that people are not allowed to remain indiscriminately. Instead, the court considers whether the presence of a person will be valuable or not and asks all others to leave.

To preserve their anonymity as above, and also to make sure that the judges will not try to curry favor with the litigants [the Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah (Sanhedrin 3:7)].

Since he would always be the spokesman, there is no way of knowing which of the judges supported either of the litigants. If, however, this was not the case, one might think that the judge announcing the verdict was the one who pushed for its acceptance (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 19:1).

This applies even when he knows that he will deliver an honest and just judgment (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 7:26).

See Chapter 2, Halachah 14.

Lest an unacceptable witness sign with them, the document be nullified, and they become embarrassed (Sanhedrin 23a).

For it is humiliating for a sage to sup together with common people (Berachot 43b). See Hilchot Deot 5:2.