Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

Or is divorced (Siftei Cohen 33:8).

Note, however, the guidelines spelled out in the following halachah.
The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 33:12) emphasizes that if a ruling was rendered while a couple was still married and then the woman died, the case may not be reopened on the basis of the testimony that her relative may give. See, however, the gloss of the Siftei Cohen 33:9.

I.e., the witness’ wife. With her death, the family connection between the witness and his former father-in-law is dissolved.

I.e., when he observes the event.

I.e., when he delivers testimony.

Bava Batra 128a derives this concept from Leviticus 5:1: “If he witnessed or saw... if he does not testify.” Implied is that the person must be acceptable as a witness at the time he sees and at the time he testifies.

I.e., he was not acceptable as a witness when he observed the evidence.

As stated in Chapter 3, Halachah 4. See also Chapter 7, Halachah 2, where the Rambam qualifies this leniency, stating: “[This applies] provided he is joined by another person who [learned to] recognize these signatures while an adult.”

See Hilchot Ishut 16:25 which mentions some of the details of these customs, e.g., wearing a crown or a special garment, celebrating in a particular manner.

As Ibid. 10:7 states, it is an obligation ordained by the Sages so that a man would not consider divorce a casual matter. If a woman is a virgin at marriage, her husband’s fundamental responsibility is 200 zuz, while if she is not a virgin at marriage, his fundamental responsibility is 100 zuz.
The Maggid Mishneh (in his gloss to Hilchot lshut 16:25) states that in contrast to the previous instance, in this and the latter instance, the word of the minor who attained majority is accepted even when no one else testifies together with him. The Radbaz defines the general principle as follows: Whenever the testimony of two witnesses are required, then the other witness must have observed the matter when he was an adult. Whenever the testimony of two witnesses is not required, there is no need for another witness at all.

I.e., this place alone and not a larger area (see Kessef Mishneh).

The term beit hapras refers to a field where a corpse was buried and accidentally the grave was plowed over causing the bones to be strewn over the entire field. Our Sages (see Ketubot 28a; Hilchot Tumat Meit 2:16) decreed that the area within 100 cubits of the original grave is considered as impure by Rabbinic decree.

As explained in Hilchot Shabbat 27:1, according to Scriptural Law, the Sabbath limits are 12 mil (a mil is approximately a kilometer in contemporary measure). Our Sages, however, restricted these limits to 2000 cubits. As the Rambam explains in Hilchot Shabbat, ch. 28, at times there can be questions regarding the determination of a city’s Sabbath limits. Our present halachah is teaching that a person’s word is accepted when he states that he remembers being allowed to proceed until a particular point on the Sabbath, indicating that this point was within the Sabbath limits.

See Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah 20:15 which describes this situation in slightly greater detail. By saying “he would receive a portion,” the Rambam emphasizes that the person whose lineage is being questioned is not a servant, because although a servant may partake of terumah given his master, he is not given a portion of terumah himself.

In this context, the Hebrew term matanot refers particular to the forearm, jaw, and the maw, presents that must be given to a priest when slaughtering a kosher animal (Hilchot Bikkurim, ch. 9). There are times when the term is used in an expanded context to refer to alI the priestly presents.

In this and the above instance, the person would be accepted as a priest, because of this testimony.
If, however, the person testifies that he remembers seeing the presents sent with others, his testimony is not accepted, for we fear that his recollections are not precise.

The Kessef Mishneh quotes Rabbenu Nissim who interprets this as referring to a situation where there are two families in the same priestly clan. It is rumored that one is acceptable and one is not acceptable. We rely on the statements of the child who attained majority to determine which is acceptable and which is not.

See Ketubot 28b. In this instance as well, the Kessef Mishneh quotes Rabbenu Nissim as explaining that we are referring to a situation where there were already suspicions regarding the acceptability of the lineage of the family in question.

As the Rambam explains in Hilchot Terumah 1:26, from the time of the exile of the Ten Tribes onward, the obligation to separate terumah is Rabbinic in origin. Since the entire Jewish people do not live on the land, the regulations governing its produce do not apply according to Scriptural law. Hence certain leniencies are taken in the determination of whether or not a person is a priest. See Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah, ch. 20.

Ketubot 28b states that this applies even if the gentile had the intent of converting when he observed the matter of concern. We are not certain that he would be careful with regard to all the particulars involved.
The commentaries note that with regard to the Sabbath limits, the Rambam rules that the word of a servant or maid-servant is accepted even if they were not freed (Hilchot Shabbat 28:19).

For, as a robber, his testimony is not acceptable.

We do not disqualify it because the person became a robber afterwards. Implied is that, although the person was acceptable as a witness when he signed the legal document, if he became a robber before the document was validated by the court, the document is not acceptable.

I.e., if the son-in-law signed the legal document before marrying the person’s daughter, the document may be validated by others.

Although the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 46:35) quotes the Rambam’s ruling, it also mentions the qualifying words of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi who states that this leniency applies only when the legal document is in the possession of another person. If, however, it is in the possession of the witnesses, it is disqualified.

I.e., we fear that the unacceptable witness composed a false document and dated it falsely, writing a date that preceded his disqualification. A witness disqualified because of a family connection, by contrast, is not suspected of lying or falsifying documents. He is disqualified only because of a Scriptural decree, without any rational explanation (see Chapter 13, Halachah 15, and notes).
According to the Rambam’s explanation, if the document was in the possession of others before the witness was disqualified because of his transgression, it may be acceptable even though it was not validated by the court until afterwards. This conclusion is reflected in Rav Yosef Karo’s commentary in his Kessef Mishneh and his ruling in the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 46:34).

If, however, many witnesses signed it, it is possible that it is acceptable as stated in Chapter 5, Halachah 6.

When a legal document is not signed by witnesses at all and is transferred in the presence of acceptable witnesses, it is considered as binding evidence (Gittin 3b). The signature of the unacceptable witness[es], however, causes the legal document to be disqualified. Compare to Hilchot Gerushin 1: 5-17.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 51:3) quotes the Rambam’s opinion, but also quotes the opinion of the Baal Halachot Gedolot and the Tur who refer to the explanations given in Chapter 5, Halachah 6: that perhaps the witness signed merely to fill up the empty space on the legal document. On this basis, these authorities maintain that the legal document is considered as a legal document signed by one witness. The Siftei Cohen 51:4 laboriously argues that even the Rambam would accept this view.

Without dividing the property and specifying which person receives which portion.

And if a portion of the testimony is nullified, the entire testimony is nullified [Kessef Mishneh, citing the Jerusalem Talmud (Makkot 1:7)].
In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo elaborates in support of the Rambam’s position although Rav Hai Gaon and other Rishonim rule differently. In his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 51:6), however, he mentions a leniency. If the recipient who is related to the witnesses renounces all claims to the property, the other recipient may receive his share. The Siftei Cohen 51:6 disputes this ruling, stating that according to the principle: “If a portion of the testimony is nullified, the entire testimony is nullified,” the testimony cannot be restored by any means.

Since the statements are distinct, we divide the testimony and accept the portion which is acceptable and reject the other portion.